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 1 
Technology licensing in a differentiated oligopoly 
 
1. Introduction 
Technology licensing is an important element of conduct in many industries and has 
attracted a fair amount of attention in the industrial organization literature. The 
seminal papers by Kamien and Tauman (1984 and 1986) show that, if an innovator, 
who is not a producer,1 licenses a technology to the final goods producers and the 
product market is characterized by Cournot competition, licensing with output royalty 
generates lower profit to the innovator compared to fixed-fee licensing and auction, 
regardless of the industry size and/or magnitude of the innovation.2 In view of this 
theoretical result, the wide prevalence of output royalty in the licensing contracts (see, 
e.g., Taylor and Silberstone, 1973 and Rostoker, 1984) has remained a puzzle. For 
example, it is shown in Rostoker (1984) that royalty alone has been used in 39% of 
cases, fixed-fee alone for 13% of cases and royalty and fixed-fee for 46% of cases, 
among the firms surveyed. Hence, a large fraction of the licensing contracts involving 
output royalty has been unexplained by Kamien and Tauman (1984 and 1986), and 
has created significant interest in explaining the rationale for using output royalty in 
the licensing contracts. 
The factors attributed to the presence of output royalty in the licensing 
contracts offered by outside innovators3 are asymmetric information (Gallini and 
Wright, 1990, Beggs, 1992, Poddar and Sinha, 2002 and Sen, 2005b), Bertrand 
competition (Muto, 1993), spatial competition (Poddar and Sinha, 2004), moral 
                                                 
1 Licensing by the universities or independent research labs to the producers may be the examples of 
this scenario.  
2 See Kamien (1992) for a nice survey of this literature. 
3 Outside innovator refers to the situation were the innovator (who is the licenser) and the licensees do 
not compete in the product market. 
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hazard (Macho-Stadler et al., 1996 and Cho, 2001), risk aversion (Bousquet et al., 
1998), incumbent innovator (Shapiro, 1985, Kamien and Tauman, 2002 and Sen and 
Tauman, 2007), leadership structure (Kabiraj, 2004), strategic incentive delegation 
(Saracho, 2002), integer constraint on the number of licenses (Sen, 2005), input 
market power (Mukherjee, 2010) and convex costs (Mukherjee, 2010).4 
 An important feature of the above mentioned papers, except Muto (1993) and 
Poddar and Sinha (2004), is their focus on homogeneous goods, thus ignoring the 
effects of product variety. Moreover, Muto (1993) and Poddar and Sinha (2004) fail to 
capture the effects of product market competition due to their attention to duopoly 
final goods markets. 
 In a simple model with an outside innovator, we show the implications of 
product differentiation and product market competition on fixed-fee and output 
royalty in the licensing contracts. In order to understand the implications of product 
differentiation and product market competition clearly on the different instruments of 
the licensing contracts, we consider licensing with auction where the fixed-fees are 
the winning bids of the licensees, and licensing with royalty separately. A simple 
extension of our analysis will be to consider a licensing contract combining fixed-fee 
and royalty, where all the effects shown in our analysis will interact. 
Using the widely used demand structure due to Bowley (1924), where higher 
product differentiation increases value of the product to the consumers and enlarges 
the final goods market, and with 2n ≥  potential licensees, which face the same 
                                                 
4 There is a related literature which shows the superiority of royalty licensing and licensing with a 
combination of fixed-fee and royalty when the licenser and the licensees compete in the product market 
(see, e.g., Rockett, 1990, Wang, 1998 and 2002, Wang and Yang , 1999, Filippini, 2001, Mukherjee 
and Balasubramanian, 2001, Faulí-Oller and Sandonis, 2002,  Fosfuri, 2004, Kabiraj, 2005, Poddar and 
Sinha, 2005 and Mukherjee, 2007). In this literature, the competition softening effect of output royalty 
may make the royalty licensing preferable than fixed-fee licensing if the licenser and the licensees 
compete in the product market. 
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(assumed to be zero, for simplicity)6 opportunity costs of winning the licenses 
irrespective of the licensing contracts, we show that if the outputs of the licensees are 
imperfect substitutes,8 royalty licensing can dominate auction under both Cournot and 
Bertrand competition if the number of potential licensees is not very small. We find 
that while the relationship between product differentiation and the minimum number 
of potential licensees that is required to make the royalty licensing profitable to the 
innovator is non-monotonic under Cournot competition, it is positive under Bertrand 
competition. Our analysis on welfare implications shows that if the number of 
potential licensees is not very small, social welfare is higher under royalty licensing 
compared to auction, under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. 
Hence, neither the innovator nor the antitrust authority may require 
information about the type of product market competition while deciding on the 
licensing contract. Further, there may not be a disagreement between the innovator 
and the  antitrust authority on the preference for a licensing contract. 
We have written our results in terms of royalty licensing and auction, where 
the fixed-fees are the winning bids of the licensees. It is worth mentioning that, since 
the opportunity costs of the licensees in our analysis do not depend on the type of the 
licensing contract, there is no difference between an auction and a licensing contract 
where the fixed-fee is charged by the innovator (see Kamien et al., 1992). Hence, 
whatever we report under auction is also relevant for a fixed-fee licensing. 
We have several motivations for considering licensing of a technology where 
the opportunity costs of winning the licenses do not depend on the licensing contracts. 
                                                 
6 Zero opportunity costs of winning the licenses occur if the potential licensees either do not produce 
other products or production of the new product does not affect the profits from other products. 
8 Product differentiation may arise due to product characteristics such as brand name, packaging and 
after sales service, which are not dependent on the production technologies (Chamberlin, 1933). Hence, 
consumer perception about different firms may be responsible for creating product differentiation. 
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First motivation comes immediately from Muto (1993) and Sen and Tauman (2007). 
Muto (1993), which is most closely related to our paper, shows that royalty licensing 
can dominate either fixed-fee licensing or auction under Bertrand competition if the 
licensees’ opportunity costs of winning the licenses depend on the type of licensing 
contract (which occurs under non-drastic innovation)9; however, royalty licensing 
cannot dominate fixed-fee licensing or auction under Cournot competition, 
irrespective of whether or not the opportunity costs of winning the licenses depend on 
the type of the licensing contract (see, Muto, 1988, for the details). Hence, his work 
suggests that the innovator’s preference for a licensing contract depend on the type of 
product market competition. Therefore, among other things, an outside innovator 
needs to know the nature of the product market competition while choosing the patent 
licensing contract. 
In contrast to Muto (1993), we show that (i) royalty licensing can dominate 
auction under Cournot competition with imperfect substitutes, (ii) royalty licensing 
can dominate auction under Bertrand competition when the opportunity cost of 
winning a license does not depend on the type of the licensing contract , and (iii) 
perhaps most importantly, if the number of potential licensees is not very small, the 
dominance of the royalty contract over auction does not depend on the type of product 
market competition (viz., Coutnot and Bertrand competition) for moderate levels of 
product differentiation. 
Sen and Tauman (2007) show that, in the case of drastic innovation, an outside 
innovator licenses only with a fixed-fee and complete knowledge diffusion does not 
                                                 
9 In the terminology of Muto (1993), this is the case of a non-drastic innovation. Since we have 
experienced that some readers are not comfortable with the terms non-drastic and drastic innovations 
under product differentiation, we will generally avoid using those terms. Instead we will say whether or 
not the opportunity cost of winning a license depends on the type of the licensing contract.  
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occur, in the sense that the innovator contracts with only one firm. However, we show 
that an outside innovator may prefer to use royalty even for drastic innovations, and 
complete knowledge diffusion can occur. 
The same (and zero) opportunity costs of the licensees irrespective of the 
licensing contract is empirically relevant, giving us the second motivation for 
focusing on this situation. For example, the extensive discussion in Greenhalgh and 
Rogers (pg. 9, 2010) provide several examples of innovations in which such an 
assumption would approximate the real world. As mentioned there, innovations such 
as the steam engine or the microprocessor provide examples of drastic innovations. 
The invention of laser gave rise to several drastic innovations, such as the compact 
disc and the laser printer, based upon which there were a series of non-drastic 
innovations. 
Finally, we acknowledge that there are situations where the opportunity costs 
of the licensees depend on the type of the licensing contract. However, our 
assumption of the same opportunity costs of the licensees irrespective of the licensing 
contract helps us to prove our point in the simplest way by eliminating the difference 
between auction and fixed-fee licensing. Given that Sen and Tauman (2007) show the 
presence of royalty in the licensing contracts with homogeneous goods for the non-
drastic innovations, it is easy to understand from the market enlargement effect of 
product differentiation, discussed below, that our results can be valid even if the 
opportunity costs of the licensees depend on the licensing contracts. Hence, given the 
existing literature, the detailed analysis of that case will not add much to our 
knowledge. 
  In a Hotelling duopoly model with maximum product differentiation and price 
competition, Poddar and Sinha (2004) show that an outside innovator prefers royalty 
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licensing than both auction and fixed-fee licensing. However, their analysis does not 
shed light on other degrees of product differentiation, other types of product market 
competition such as quantity competition, and on oligopolistic product market 
competition where the number of licensees is more than two. We analyze all these 
issues here. Moreover, demand is perfectly inelastic in Poddar and Sinha (2004), 
while quantity demanded varies in our analysis. Our results on price competition are 
different from theirs. We show that royalty licensing is dominated by auction if the 
products of the licensees have maximum differentiation. However, for other degrees 
of product differentiation, royalty can dominate auction (or fixed fee) if the number of 
potential licensees is not very small.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We consider the case of 
Cournot competition in Section 2. Section 3 shows the implications on Bertrand 
competition. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Cournot competition 
Assume that there is an innovator, called I , who has invented a technology for a new 
product. However, I  cannot produce the good. There are 2n ≥  symmetric potential 
licensees of the product, and I  can license its technology to the potential licensees. 
To avoid analytical complexity, we ignore the integer constraint and consider the 
number of licensees as a continuous variable, unless specified otherwise. 
We assume that no licensee has a technology to produce this product. Hence, 
if a licensee does not win a license for this product, it cannot produce the product 
irrespective of the licensing contract, and is assumed to earn zero profit, for 
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simplicity. Hence, the opportunity costs of the licensees are the same and equal to 
zero irrespective of the licensing contract.11  
Assume that a potential licensee can produce the product at a constant 
marginal cost, which is assumed to be zero for simplicity, if it wins a license. Further,  
it is assumed that the products of the licensees are imperfect substitutes, due to the 
factors such as customer switching costs, differences in after-sales service, brand 
name, packaging, etc.12 We consider a demand function due to Bowley (1924), and 
assume that the inverse market demand function for the ith licensee is 
 i i iP a q Qγ −= − −  (1) 
where iP  is price of the ith product, iq  is the output of the i th licensee, iQ− is the total 
output of all licensees other than the ith licensee and [0,1]γ ∈  shows the degree of 
product differentiation. The products are perfect substitutes if 1γ = , while the 
products are completely differentiated for 0γ = . In this section, we assume that the 
competition in the produce market is characterized by Cournot competition. 
We consider the following licensing contracts designed by I : 
(i) Royalty licensing, where a fixed royalty payment r  per unit of output is 
charged by I , and any licensee that wishes to can purchase the license at 
this royalty rate.   
(ii) Auctioning k  licenses, 1 k n≤ ≤ , by I  through a first price sealed bid 
auction. The highest bidders get the license. The ties are resolved by I . 
                                                 
11 The empirical relevance of this has been discussed in the introduction. 
12 As an example of product differentiation, consider the sale of iPhones in the US. Apple (the maker of 
iPhones) does not offer cellphone services directly and hence contracts with phone companies for the 
sale of iPhones. As per a previous agreement, iPhone users had to subscribe to AT&T but from 2011, 
iPhones will also be made available to Verizon subscribers. Notice that iPhones offered through these 
two cellphone providers is likely to be imperfect substitutes, due to the different level of services 
provided by the service providers.  
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The innovator can also adopt a contract where it charges a flat pre-determined license 
fee F , and any licensee that wishes to can purchase the license at this fixed-fee. 
However, it is immediate from Kamien et al. (1992) that the essential difference 
between auction and a licensing contract, where the innovation charges the fixed-fee, 
stems from the difference in licensees’ opportunity costs of having a license. Since we 
are considering a situation with zero opportunity costs of the licensees, this difference 
does not arise. Therefore, we focus on auction and do not consider the case where the 
innovator charges the fixed-fee.  
We consider the following games for our analysis. Under royalty licensing, at 
stage 1, I  announces the uniform royalty rate r . At stage 2, the licensees 
simultaneously and independently decide whether or not to purchase a license. At 
stage 3, the licensees choose their outputs simultaneously. If only one licensee 
purchases the technology at stage 2, he produces like a monopolist at stage 3.  
Under auction, at stage 1, I  announces an auction of k  licenses, where 
1 k n≤ ≤ . At stage 2, the licensees simultaneously and independently decide whether 
or not to purchase a license, and how much to bid. At stage 3, the licensees choose 
their outputs simultaneously. If I  auctions only one license, the licensee produces 
like a monopolist at stage 3. We solve these games by backward induction. 
 
2.1. Royalty licensing 
Under royalty licensing, each licensee always prefers to purchase a license for r a< , 
since a licensee has the option of producing nothing after purchasing a license, thus 
earning 0 , which is the opportunity cost of having a license. 
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First, we determine the product market equilibrium under royalty licensing. If 
I licenses the technology to n  licensees and each of the n  licensees pays a per-unit 
royalty r, where r < a, the i th licensee, 1, 2,...,i n= , chooses his output to maximize 
the following expression: 
 ( )
i
i i iq
Max a q Q r qγ −− − − . (2) 
The equilibrium output of the i th licensee can be found as 
( ), 2 1
R
i C
a rq
nγ
−
=
+ −
. Hence, 
I  maximizes the following expression to determine the equilibrium royalty rate: 
 
( )
( )
2 1r
nr a rMax
nγ
−
+ −
. (3) 
The equilibrium royalty rate is *
2C
ar = . The equilibrium output of the ith licensee is 
( ), 4 2 1
R
i C
aq
nγ
=
+ −
, and the equilibrium payoff of I  is 
 
( )
2
4 2 1
R
C
na
nγ
Π =
+ −  
. (4) 
 
2.2. Auction 
Now consider the game under auction. If I  auctions k  licenses, where 1 k n≤ ≤ , the 
output of the i th licensee is 
( ), 2 1
A
i C
aq
kγ
=
+ −
. The profit of the i th licensee is 
( )
2
2[2 1 ]
a
kγ+ −
. Therefore, in the Nash equilibrium of the bidding game, each 
potential licensee bids 
( )
2
2[2 1 ]
a
kγ+ −
. As mentioned in Kamien et al. (1992), if 
,k n=  I  can guarantee this equilibrium bid by specifying a minimum bid. However, 
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for k n< , the potential licensees bid these amounts even if I  does not specify the 
minimum bid. 
 If I  auctions k  licenses, his payoff is 
( )
2
2[2 1 ]
A
C
ka
kγ
Π =
+ −
, and the number 
of licenses to auction is determined by maximizing the following expression: 
 
( )
2
2
2 1k
kaMax
kγ+ −  
. (5) 
The equilibrium number of licenses is given by 
 * 2min ,Ck n
γ
γ
 −
=  
 
. (6) 
The profit of I when *Ck  licenses are being sold under auction is either 
( )
2
2
2 1
A
C
na
nγ
Π =
+ −  
, for 2n γ
γ
−
≤             (7a) 
or    
( )
2
4 2
A
C
a
γ γ
Π =
−
,  for 2n γ
γ
−
> .            (7b) 
 
 
2.3. Comparing auction with royalty licensing 
First, consider 2n γ
γ
−
≤ . In this situation, the profits of the innovator under royalty 
licensing and under auction are given by (4) and (7a) respectively. The comparison 
shows that R AC C
>
Π Π
<
 if 
     2 1n
γ
>
+
<
.              (8a) 
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Since we are considering a situation where 2n γ
γ
−
≤ , it is then immediate that 
2 1n
γ
> +  cannot hold. In other words, if 2n γ
γ
−
≤ , the innovator is always better off 
under auction than under royalty licensing.    
The reason for the above result is as follows. If 2n γ
γ
−
≤ , the number of 
licenses is the same under auction and under royalty licensing. However, royalty 
licensing distorts the output of the licensees and also does not allow the innovator to 
extract the entire profits of the licensees. Hence, an auction generates higher profit to 
the innovator compared to royalty licensing, if the number of licenses is the same 
under auction and royalty licensing. 
Now consider the case where 2n γ
γ
−
≥ . In this situation, the profits of the 
innovator under royalty licensing and under auction are given by (4) and (7b) 
respectively. The comparison shows that R AC C
>
Π Π
<
 if 
    
( )
2
1
n γ
γ γ
> −
< −
.                          (8b) 
Since 
( )
2 2
1
γ γ
γ γ γ
− −
>
−
, and we are now considering a situation where 2n γ
γ
−
> , it is 
then immediate that innovator prefers royalty licensing to auction if 
( )
2
1
n γ
γ γ
−
>
−
, but 
it prefers auction to royalty licensing if 
( )
2 2( , )
1
n γ γ
γ γ γ
− −
∈
−
.   
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We have seen that if 
( )
2
1
n γ
γ γ
−
>
−
, the innovator prefers royalty licensing 
compared to auction. However, it follows from (8b) and has also been shown in 
Figure 1 that this condition cannot be satisfied for a finite n if the products are either 
very much differentiated (i.e., 0γ → ) or are close substitutes (i.e., 1γ → ). Further, 
we get that right hand side (RHS) of (8b) attains the minimum value at 
.59( .)approxγ = , and the minimum value of RHS of (8b) is 5.8 (approx.). Hence, in 
order for royalty licensing to generate a higher profit for the innovator compared to 
the auction (i.e., to satisfy the condition 
( )
2
1
n γ
γ γ
−
>
−
), it is necessary that the number 
of potential licensees be at least 6.   
Figure 1 below shows the condition 
( )
2
1
n γ
γ γ
−
>
−
 for (0,1)γ ∈  and n > 6. It 
follows from the diagram that the innovator earns higher profit under royalty licensing 
compared to auction for the intermediate levels of product differentiation, while 
auction is more profitable at the extremes. 
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Figure 1: Comparison of n and 
( )
2
1
γ
γ γ
−
−
 for (0,1)γ ∈  and n=10. 
The following result summarizes the above discussion. 
 
Proposition 1: Consider Cournot competition in the product market. Unless the 
number of licensees is very small (which is 6 in our analysis), the innovator prefers 
royalty licensing compared to auction for intermediate values of γ , but it prefers 
auction for low and high values of γ . As n increases, it increases the range of γ  over 
which the innovator’s profit is higher under royalty licensing compared to auction. 
 
 The intuition for the above result is as follows. The comparison between the 
innovator’s profits depends on two factors: 
 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

10
20
30
40
21
( )
2
1
γ
γ γ
−
−
( )
2
1
γ
γ γ
−
−
Auction
n n
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1. Output distortion effect: A royalty imposes additional marginal costs on the 
licensees and results in a reduction of output compared to auction. This factor 
makes the royalty contract less attractive to the innovator compared to auction. 
2. Market enlargement effect: Given our demand structure, it follows from 
Martin (2002) that an increase in the number of producers enlarges the market 
size. Hence, if the number of licensees is higher under royalty licensing than 
under auction, the market size is also larger under the royalty contract. As a 
result, if the number of licensees is higher under royalty, then the market 
enlargement effect tends to make the royalty contract more attractive from the 
perspective of the innovator.  
 
Overall, the attractiveness of the royalty contract relative to an auction 
depends on the relative strength of the two above-mentioned factors. For the 
discussion below, recall that the number of licenses under the royalty contract is n  
but the number of licenses under an auction is given by * 2min ,Ck n
γ
γ
 −
=  
 
. First, 
consider the case when the products are significantly differentiated (i.e., when γ  is 
close to 0). In this situation, the number of licenses is n  under both contracts and the 
market enlargement effect does not play any role. However, the output distortion 
effect operates and this makes the royalty contract less profitable for the innovator 
compared to an auction. Second, we consider the other extreme, that is the case in 
which the products are sufficiently similar (i.e., when γ  is close to 1). In this 
situation, the number of licenses is substantially lower under auction compared to 
royalty licensing. However, since the products are close substitutes, the profits of the 
licensees are low. Hence, the additional fee that the innovator can extract under the 
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royalty contract is low as well, i.e., the market enlargement effect is weak in this case. 
Hence, the output distortion effect again dominates the market enlargement effect and 
the innovator’s profit is higher under auction. Finally, consider the case of moderate 
product differentiation. In this situation, the number of licenses is higher under royalty 
licensing compared to auction, and the market enlargement effect under royalty 
licensing is strong enough to outweigh the royalty licensing’s output distortion effect, 
thus making the innovator better off under royalty licensing. 
 We have shown the effects of product differentiation and product market 
competition on the licensing contracts with fixed-fee and output royalty separately. 
This allows us to show clearly how the output distortion effect and the market 
enlargement effect interact in order to create the preference for a particular 
instrument, viz., fixed-fee or output royalty, in the licensing contract. One can also 
consider a combination of a fixed fee and a royalty. Since this extension is 
straightforward and does not add much to the purpose of this paper, we do not go into 
the details of this analysis. 
 
2.4. Welfare 
Now we show how product differentiation and product market competition affect 
welfare through their effects on fixed-fee and output royalty. Welfare is the sum of 
consumer surplus and the total profits of the innovator and the licensees. 
It can be shown that consumer surplus under the royalty licensing is  
 
( )
( )
2
2
1 1
8 2 1
R
C
a n n
CS
n
γ
γ
+ −  =
+ −  
 (7) 
and consumer surplus under auction is 
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2
2
[1 ( 1)]
2[2 ( 1)]
A
C
a n nCS
n
γ
γ
+ −
=
+ −
, for 2n γ
γ
−
≤ .           (8a)  
( )
( )
2 3 2
8 2
A
C
a
CS
γ
γ γ
−
=
−
,  for 2n γ
γ
−
≥ .           (8b)  
Further, welfare under royalty licensing is  
 ( )2,R R R RC C C i CW CS n q= +Π +  (9) 
and under auction is  
 A A AC C CW CS= +Π . (10) 
Note that there are three terms in the right hand side of (9) but only two terms in (10). 
This is because the net profits of the licensees are positive under royalty licensing, 
while their net profits are zero under auction. 
 First, consider the case where 2n γ
γ
−
≤ . By comparing (8a) and (10), it 
follows that the consumer surplus is higher under auction than under royalty 
licensing. Further, it has been discussed above that the profit of the innovator is also 
higher under auction in this case, since 
( )
2 2
1
γ γ
γ γ γ
− −
<
−
. However, the profit of each 
licensee is positive under royalty licensing while it is 0 under auction. The 
comparison of (9) and (10) shows that the higher total net profits of the licensees 
under royalty licensing compared to auction are not high enough to outweigh the 
lower consumer surplus and the lower profit of the innovator under royalty licensing 
compared to auction. Hence, welfare is higher under auction compared to royalty 
licensing for 2n γ
γ
−
≤ . 
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Now consider the case where 2n γ
γ
−
> . In this situation, consumer surplus is 
higher under auction than under royalty licensing, and the profit of the innovator may 
be higher or lower under auction than under royalty licensing depending on whether n 
is lower or higher than 
( )
2
1
γ
γ γ
−
−
. However, the total net profits of the licensees are 
higher under royalty licensing than under auction. It can be shown that, for a given γ , 
welfare is higher under royalty licensing (auction) for 
*(2 )(3 29 ( 34 9 ))( )
2 (1 ) C
n n
γ γ γ γ
γ γ
− − + − +
> < ≡
−
.             (13) 
It can be checked that * 2Cn
γ
γ
−
≥ .13 It follows from *Cn  that (13) cannot hold for 1γ =  
and 0γ = ,14 while it may hold for intermediate values of γ . Further, we get that in 
order for n to be greater than *Cn  , it is necessary that 17n ≥ .  
 The next proposition summarizes the result on welfare. 
 
Proposition 2: Consider Cournot competition in the product market. Unless the 
number of potential licenses is very small (which is 17 in our analysis), welfare is 
higher under royalty licensing compared to auction for moderate values of γ , but it is 
higher under auction for high and low values of γ . As n increases from 17, it 
increases the range of γ  over which welfare is higher under royalty licensing 
compared to auction.  
 
                                                 
13 It may worth noting that the demand intercept, a, does not arise in (13) since it gets cancelled under 
comparison. 
14 In fact, (13) does not hold for reasonable values of n if γ  is either close to 0 or it is close to 1. For 
example,  if .1γ = , (13) holds provided n is at least 85. 
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The intuition for the above result is as follows. The effect of different 
licensing contracts on welfare also depends on the trade off created by the output 
distortion effect and the market enlargement effect. The output distortion effect tends 
to reduce welfare under the royalty licensing compared to auction, and the market 
enlargement effect tends to create the opposite effect. If the products of the firms are 
sufficiently differentiated (i.e., if γ  is close to 0), the number of licenses under 
auction is close to the number of licenses under auction and hence the market 
enlargement effect is small. Hence, in this case, the output distortion effect is the 
dominant effect and this results in a higher welfare under an auction. Conversely, if 
the products are sufficiently similar (i.e., if γ  is close to 1), even if the number of 
licenses are higher under royalty licensing compared to auction, the market 
enlargement effect is very weak since the products are close substitutes. In this 
situation, again the output distortion effect dominates the market enlargement effect, 
and results in a higher welfare under auction compared to royalty licensing. It is only 
for intermediate values of γ  that the market enlargement effect can be strong enough 
to outweigh the output distortion effect, thus resulting in higher welfare under royalty 
licensing compared to auction.   
Propositions 1 and 2 together show that if the number of potential licensees is 
sufficiently large and if the degree of product differentiation is moderate, both the 
innovator and the society prefer royalty licensing. Thus, we show the effects of 
product market competition and product variety in determining the privately and 
socially preferred licensing contracts. 
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3. Bertrand competition 
The purpose of this section is to show that our main results of the previous section 
occur even under Bertrand competition. Thus, we show that if the number of potential 
licensees is not very small, both the innovator and society can be better off under 
royalty licensing irrespective of the type of product market competition. 
Given the inverse demand function (1), the demand function for firm i is: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 2
1 1 1
i jj i
i
a n p p
q
n
γ γ γ
γ γ
≠
− − + − +  =
− + −  
∑
. (14) 
In order to avoid the well known “Bertrand paradox”, we will mainly concentrate on 
[0,1)γ ∈  in this section. 
  
3.1 Royalty licensing 
First, determine the product market equilibrium under royalty licensing. If I licenses 
the technology to n  licensees and each of the n  licensees pays a per-unit output 
royalty r, where r < a, the equilibrium output of the i th licensee, 1, 2,...,i n= , is 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ),
1 2
1 1 1
R
i B
a r n
q
n
γ
γ γ
− + −  =
− + −  
. Hence, I  maximizes the following expression to 
determine the equilibrium royalty rate: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2
1 1 1r
nr a r n
Max
n
γ
γ γ
− + −  
− + −  
. (15) 
The equilibrium royalty rate is *
2B
ar = . The equilibrium output of the ith licensee is 
( )
( ) ( ),
1 2
2 1 1 1
R
i B
a n
q
n
γ
γ γ
+ −  =
− + −  
, and the equilibrium payoff of I  is 
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( )
( ) ( )
2 1 2
4 1 1 2 3
R
B
na n
n n
γ
γ γ
+ −  Π =
+ − + −      
. (16) 
 
3.2. Auction 
Now consider the game under auction. If I  auctions k  licenses, where 1 k n≤ ≤ , the 
output of the i th licensee is 
( )
( ) [ ],
1 2
1 1 2 ( 3)
A
i B
a k
q
k k
γ
γ γ
+ −  =
+ − + −  
 and the profit of the i th 
licensee is 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
2
1 1 2
1 1 2 3
a k
k k
γ γ
γ γ
− + −  
+ − + −      
. Therefore, in equilibrium, each potential 
licensee bids 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
2
1 1 2
1 1 2 3
a k
k k
γ γ
γ γ
− + −  
+ − + −      
. If k n= , I  can guarantee this 
equilibrium bid by specifying a minimum bid. However, for k n< , the licensees bid 
these amounts even if I  does not specify the minimum bid. 
 If I  auctions k  licenses, his payoff is 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
2
1 1 2
1 1 2 3
A
B
a k k
k k
γ γ
γ γ
− + −  Π =
+ − + −      
, and 
the number of licenses to auction is determined by maximizing the following 
expression:  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
2
1 1 2
1 1 2 3
a k k
k k
γ γ
γ γ
− + −  
+ − + −      
.    (17) 
Since we cannot find a closed form solution for the above maximization problem, in 
the following analysis, we solve for the optimal value of k  numerically. 
We consider three values of γ : .1γ = , .5γ =  and .9γ = . Thus, we consider 
very low, very high and intermediate values of γ . We get that the equilibrium number 
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of licenses as * ( .1) 18Bk γ = = ,  
* ( .5) 2Bk γ = =  and 
* ( .9) 1Bk γ = = .
15 Hence, as product 
differentiation increases, i.e., as γ  reduces, the equilibrium number of licenses under 
auction increases. The corresponding profits of I are 2( .1) 1.27347AB aγ∏ = = , 
2( .5) .296296AB aγ∏ = =  and 
2( .9) .25AB aγ∏ = = .  
 
3.3. Comparing auction with royalty licensing 
Now compare the profits of the innovator under auction and royalty licensing for 
.1γ = , .5γ =  and .9γ = . We get that the corresponding profits of the innovator under 
royalty licensing are 
( )
( ) ( )
2 1 (.1) 2
( .1)
4 1 (.1) 1 2 (.1) 3
R
B
na n
n n
γ
+ −  Π = =
+ − + −      
, 
( )
( ) ( )
2 1 (.5) 2
( .5)
4 1 (.5) 1 2 (.5) 3
R
B
na n
n n
γ
+ −  Π = =
+ − + −      
 and 
( )
( ) ( )
2 1 (.9) 2
( .9)
4 1 (.9) 1 2 (.9) 3
R
B
na n
n n
γ
+ −  Π = =
+ − + −      
. In all these cases, the profit of the 
innovator is higher under royalty licensing than under auction if the number of the 
potential licensees is sufficiently large. Royalty licensing is better for the innovator 
for 20n ≥  if .1γ = , for 4n ≥  if .5γ =  and for 3n ≥  if .9γ = . Therefore, given a 
degree of product differentiation, the innovator prefers royalty licensing compared to 
auction if the number of potential licensees is sufficiently large.  
Further, as the degree of product differentiation increases, i.e., as γ  reduces, 
the minimum number of potential licensees required to make royalty licensing more 
profitable to the innovator compared to an auction increases as well. Under Cournot 
competition, the minimum number of potential licensees required to make royalty 
                                                 
15 We are considering the number of firms as integers. 
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licensing more attractive compared to auction depends on 
( )
2
1
γ
γ γ
−
−
. Notice that this 
term is non-monotonic in γ . Hence, the result obtained under Bertrand competition 
contrasts with the one obtained under Cournot competition.  
The following proposition summarizes the above discussion. 
 
Proposition 3: Consider Bertrand competition in the product market. For a given 
(0,1)γ ∈ , the innovator is better off under royalty licensing compared to auction if 
the number of potential licensees is sufficiently large. Further, the minimum number 
of potential licensees that is required to make the innovator better off under royalty 
licensing increases if γ  reduces. 
 
 Proposition 3 does not incorporate the cases of 0γ =  and 1γ = . If 0γ = , that 
is, if the products of the licensees are completely differentiated, the innovator licenses 
to all of the potential licensees under both auction and royalty licensing, and is better 
off under auction. On the other hand, if 1γ = , i.e., if the products are perfect 
substitutes, the innovator will sell one license under auction, and will earn 
2
4
a . 
However, if 1γ = , the profit of the innovator under royalty licensing will also be 
2
4
a . 
Hence, the innovator is indifferent between auction and royalty licensing if 1γ = . 
This is in line with Kamien (1992). 
  
3.4 Welfare 
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Now we compare welfare under royalty licensing and auction, and show that welfare 
can be higher under royalty licensing. 
It can be shown that consumer surplus under royalty licensing is  
 
[ ]( )2,1 ( 1)
2
r
i PR
B
n n q
CS
γ+ −
=  (18) 
and under auction is  
 
[ ]( )2,1 ( 1)
2
F
i PA
B
k k q
CS
γ+ −
= . (19) 
Further, welfare under the royalty licensing is  
 ( )2,R R R RB B B i BW CS n q= +Π +  (20) 
and under auction is  
 A A AB B BW CS= +Π . (21) 
In general, welfare can go either way. In Figure 2 below, we plot welfare under 
royalty licensing and under auction for 10a =  and 30n = . Figure 2 shows that 
welfare is higher under auction for low values of γ  but it is higher under royalty 
licensing for high values of γ . 
 Figure 2 along with Proposition 3 shows that if the number of potential 
licensees is sufficiently large, both the innovator and society can be better off under 
royalty licensing compared to auction if the products are not very much differentiated.  
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Figure 2: Welfare comparison under Bertrand competition for a = 10 and n = 30. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
We consider technology licensing by an outside innovator, and show the effects of 
product differentiation and competition (given by the number of licensees producing 
in the market) on the innovator’s profit and social welfare. We show that both the 
innovator and the society can be better off under royalty licensing compared to 
auction if the number of potential licensees is sufficiently large. We find that the 
relationship between product differentiation and the minimum number of potential 
licensees that is required to make the royalty licensing profitable to the innovator is 
non-monotonic under Cournot competition, while it is positive under Bertrand 
competition.  
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 Hence, our analysis suggests that if the number of potential licensees is large,  
there is a wide range of the product differentiation parameter in which the innovator 
and the antitrust authority both prefer the royalty contract, regardless of the type of 
product market competition. 
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